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Abstract
The Burkholderia cepacia complex is a group of Gram-negative bacteria known as respiratory pathogens in cystic ﬁbrosis patients, but also
increasingly reported as a cause of healthcare associated infections. We describe an outbreak of B. cepacia bloodstream infections in a
referral hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Over a 1.5-month period, blood cultures from eight adult patients grew B. cepacia. Bloodstream
infection occurred after a median of 2.5 days of hospitalisation. Three patients died: 7, 10 and 17 days after blood cultures were sampled. As
part of the outbreak investigation, patient ﬁles were reviewed and environmental sampling was performed. All patients had peripheral
venous catheters that were ﬂushed with Ringer lactate drawn from a 1 L bag, used as multiple-dose vial at the ward. Cultures of unopened
Ringer lactate and disinfectants remained sterile but an in-use bag of Ringer lactate solution and the dispensing pin grew B. cepacia. The
isolates from patients and ﬂushing solution were identiﬁed as B. cepacia by recA gene sequence analysis, and random ampliﬁed polymorphic
DNA typing conﬁrmed clonal relatedness. The onset of the outbreak had coincided with the introduction of a dispensing pin with a screw ﬁt
that did not allow proper disinfection. Re-enforcement of aseptic procedures with sterile syringe and needle has ended the outbreak.
Growth of B. cepacia should alert the possibility of healthcare associated infection also in tropical resource-limited settings. The use of
multiple-dose vials should be avoided and newly introduced procedures should be assessed for infection control risks.
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Introduction
Healthcare associated infections (HAI) are a worldwide
challenge but particularly affect developing countries, where
they tend to occur unrecognized or undocumented. The
prevalence of HAI in developing countries was found to be
15.5 per 100 patients [1], which is at least double the rates
published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control [2].
The Burkholderia cepacia complex (Bcc) comprises 17 closely
related species of Gram-negative rods that are widely distrib-
uted in the environment, one of them is B. cepacia [3]. They
are a threat to persons with cystic ﬁbrosis and emerge as
opportunistic nosocomial pathogens due to their abilities to
survive in humid environments with minimal nutrition and
their intrinsic resistance to antiseptics.
We describe an outbreak of B. cepacia bloodstream
infections (BSI) during a 1.5-month period in a referral hospital
in Cambodia. The outbreak was alerted by a bacterial
surveillance program of BSI and traced to the extrinsic
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contamination of Ringer lactate solution used as multiple-dose
vial (MDV) to ﬂush peripheral venous catheters. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst report of a common-source
outbreak of B. cepacia BSI from a resource-limited setting
(RLS).
Methods
Setting and patients
The Sihanouk Hospital Centre of HOPE (SHCH) is a 35-bed
non-governmental referral hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
The hospital serves a large adult outpatient population with
chronic diseases and has four inpatient wards. Bacteriology
laboratory services were installed in 2005 and since July 2007 a
prospective surveillance study of bacterial pathogens causing
BSI is on-going. Ethical approval for this study was granted
from the review boards at the Institute of Tropical Medicine
and the University Hospital of Antwerp, Belgium and the
National Ethical Committee, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Bacterial cultures and identiﬁcation
As part of the on-going surveillance blood cultures are
sampled when signs of Systemic Inﬂammatory Response
Syndrome (SIRS) are present [4]. Blood (2 9 10 mL) is
cultured in BacT/ALERT bottles (bioMe´rieux, Marcy l’Etoile,
France) and incubated for 7 days at 35°C with daily visual
inspection of the chromogenic indicator for growth. According
to standard work-up in SHCH, Gram-negative rods are
screened for polymyxin resistance (Rosco Diagnostica A/S,
Taastrup, Denmark) upon primary subculture. Polymixin
resistant oxidase positive isolates are tested with B. pseudo-
mallei speciﬁc latex agglutination (Mahidol-Oxford Tropical
Medicine Research Unit, Bangkok, Thailand) and presumptively
identiﬁed with API 20 NE (bioMe´rieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France).
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing is performed on Mueller
Hinton agar (BIO-RAD, Berkeley, CA, USA) using disk
diffusion according to CLSI M100-S22 guidelines [5]. All
isolates are stored at 70°C on porous beads (Microbank,
Pro-Lab Diagnostics, Richmond Hill, ON, Canada) pending
shipment and further analysis. For the purpose of this
outbreak, further microbiological assessment was done in
batch testing with MicroScan NBC42 panels (Siemens Health-
care Diagnostics, West Sacramento, CA, USA) at the Institute
of Tropical Medicine (Antwerp, Belgium) and molecular
analyses were done at the Laboratory of Microbiology of
Ghent University (Belgium).
Environmental sampling and culture
As part of the outbreak investigation, the following items were
cultured: oxygen masks, stock materials of ﬂuids for intrave-
nous (IV) administration, venous catheters, administration sets,
antiseptic solutions, an IV catheter removed from one patient
as well as the connected NaCl 0.9% solution and a Ringer
lactate bag with its dispensing pin used as MDV for ﬂushing
catheters. A 100 lL volume of the solutions was aseptically
sampled with a syringe, the catheter-tip was aseptically cut off,
the dispensing pin (Fig. 1) was ﬂushed with sterile NaCl 0.9%
and oxygen masks were swabbed. These environmental
samples were primarily cultured in 10 mL Brain Heart Infusion
broth (BIO-RAD, Berkeley, CA, USA) and Ashdown selective
broth at 35°C for 3 days and subsequently subcultured and
worked-up as for clinical samples. Ashdown is a selective broth
containing colistine sulphomethate which is in use at SHCH for
the recovery of B. pseudomallei from non-sterile site
specimens, supporting the growth of Bcc as well [6].
Bcc species identiﬁcation and assessment of clonal
relatedness
Isolates were identiﬁed by recA gene sequence analysis and
clonal relatedness was assessed by random ampliﬁed poly-
morphic DNA (RAPD) analysis. DNA was prepared by
alkaline lysis [7], PCR ampliﬁcation and sequencing of recA
was performed as previously described [8] with primers
described by Baldwin et al. [9]. Sequences were assembled
and compared to those of Bcc type- and reference strains
with BioNumerics v5.10 (Applied Maths NV, Sint-Maartens-
Latem, Belgium) and sequence identity was conﬁrmed by using
the NCBI BLAST server web portal (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/blast/Blast.cgi).
FIG. 1. Left: Needleless dispensing pin
connected to 1L bag of Ringer lactate
solution used as MDV for catheter
ﬂushing, Right: detail of dispensing pin
with screw ﬁt that was difﬁcult to disinfect
adequately.
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For RAPD, primers 270 and 272 were used as described
before [10, 11], and proﬁles were compared visually. In
addition to the clinical and environmental samples, ﬁve
B. cepacia reference strains were included in RAPD analysis:
the B. cepacia type strain ATCC 25416T, reference strains of
the Bcc experimental strain panel LMG 18821 and LMG 2161,
R-8575 from rice seeds, and R-20435 from a HAI in Thailand.
One additional B. cepacia isolate was included isolated from
blood culture on the 17th of August 2011 in the Kampong
Cham provincial hospital, Cambodia.
Review of the SHCH bacterial strain collection (2007–2011)
showed four other Bcc clinical isolates, all recovered in 2008
from blood, urine, pleural ﬂuid and sputum, respectively. These
isolates were retrieved for species identiﬁcation together with
the outbreak isolates.
Chart review, corrective and preventive actions
During and after the outbreak, patient charts were assessed
for common medications and exposures. Medical, nursing and
sampling procedures were reviewed during discussions with
the nursing staff, infectious diseases physicians and laboratory
staff.
Results
Setting and patients
On July 7th 2011 the bacteriology laboratory of SHCH alerted
the clinicians about the growth of two Bcc isolates from the
blood of two patients within 1 week time. Over the following
1.5-month period (July – August 2011), a total of eight patients
grew B. cepacia from blood cultures. All patients were
hospitalised at the medical ward (a 14 bed ward) and
represented 18% of 49 admissions at this ward during the
outbreak period. Median age of the eight patients was 47 years
(range 24–71 years), six were female. Table 1 lists the
patients’ demographics and clinical information and Fig. 2
illustrates the timeline of the outbreak. BSI occurred after a
median of 2.5 days of hospitalisation (range 2–7 days) and the
median time to positivity of blood cultures was 3 days (range
3–6 days). After blood culture results had become available, all
but two patients were treated with appropriate antibiotics (i.e.
ceftazidime with or without trimethoprim-sulphamethoxaz-
ole). Three patients died: 7, 10 and 17 days respectively after
blood cultures were sampled. However, mortality in these
patients was most likely not directly attributable to B. cepacia
BSI as these patients had end stage liver failure.
Environmental sampling
To rule out a pseudo-outbreak, the antiseptic solutions used
for blood culture sampling (poviodine-iodine 10% and isopro-
pyl alcohol 70%), were sampled on July the 12th and 22nd,
both from the affected ward and the laboratory, but all these
cultures remained sterile. Samples of unopened stock mate-
rials for IV administration cultured on July the 22nd were
sterile and excluded intrinsic (i.e. manufacturing-related)
contamination. The cultures of oxygen masks remained sterile.
On July 26th, the IV catheter from patient 5 as well as the
connected NaCl 0.9% solution were cultured, both grew
B. cepacia. Cultures of the Ringer lactate solution used as MDV
for ﬂushing IV catheters and the connected dispensing pin
were taken on August 9th and yielded both B. cepacia.
Bacterial cultures and identiﬁcation
A total of 11 outbreak isolates were available for further
analysis: eight clinical isolates (one from each patient) and
three environmental isolates (NaCl 0.9% from patient 5,
Ringer lactate used as MDV, dispensing pin from MDV). All
isolates were yellow pigmented and showed a metallic shine on
blood-agar. B. pseudomallei speciﬁc latex agglutination was
negative for all isolates and API 20 NE identiﬁed all isolates as
B. cepacia with proﬁles 0477577 (nine isolates) and 0467577
(two isolates) after 48 h. Analysis with MicroScan gave two
biotypes 0041772 (six isolates) and 4041772 (ﬁve isolates). All
isolates had identical susceptibility proﬁles: (natural) resistance
to polymyxin, gentamicin and amoxicillin-clavulanic acid with
TABLE 1. Patients demographics and clinical information
Patient Age Sex Underlying disease Clinical diagnosis Day of BSI Treatment received Outcome
1 42 Female DMII, PTB Pneumonia 7 Ceftazidime + TMP/SMX Discharged day 18
2 52 Female Liver cirrhosis SBP, hepatic encephalopathy 2 Ceftazidime + TMP/SMX Died day 17
3 53 Female Liver cirrhosis, HCV infection SBP, hepatic encephalopathy 2 Ceftazidime + TMP/SMX Died day 10
4 29 Male – Malaria, pneumonia 5 Doxycycline Discharged day 8
5 41 Female Liver cirrhosis Hepatic encephalopathy 2 Ceftazidime Died day 7
6 71 Female DMII, chronic renal failure,
congestive heart failure
Pneumonia, cardiac decompensation 3 Ceftazidime + TMP/SMX Discharged day 11
7 53 Female Goitre, valvular heart disease Urinary tract infection,
cardiac decompensation
2 Cefuroxime Discharged day 5
8 24 Male – Cryptococcal meningitis 3 Ceftazidime Discharged day 24
BSI, bloodstream infection; DMII, diabetes mellitus type 2; PTB, pulmonary tuberculosis; SBP, spontaneous bacterial peritonitis; HCV, hepatitis C virus; TMP/SMX, trimethoprim-
sulphamethoxazole.
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susceptibility for trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, ceftazidime
and meropenem.
Bcc species identiﬁcation and assessment of clonal
relatedness
Sequence analysis of recA gene sequence of the outbreak
isolates were 98,9% similar to those of the B. cepacia type
strain, thus identifying them as B. cepacia [3, 9]. The four Bcc
clinical isolates retrieved from the SHCH bacteria collection
were identiﬁed as B. cenocepacia IIIB (n = 1), B. cenocepacia IIIA
(n = 2) and B. seminalis (n = 1) (data not shown).
RAPD analysis revealed the following results (Fig. 3): for
primer 270 all isolates showed identical RAPD proﬁles, and for
primer 272 all but one isolate had identical RAPD proﬁles. The
discrepant isolate (of patient 1) showed a slightly different
RAPD proﬁle with three extra bands: a double band around
1000 bp and an extra band between 400 and 200 bp. These
differences were interpreted as a normal ﬁnding in the
short-time evolution of the isolates, and it was concluded
that clinical and environmental isolates were clonally related.
The reference strains showed clearly distinct RAPD proﬁles as
did the B. cepacia isolate from the Kampong Cham hospital in
Cambodia.
Chart review, corrective and preventive actions
A standard 1 L bag of NaCl 0.9% solution or, depending on the
availability, of Ringer lactate was used as MDV for ﬂushing the
non-heparinised peripheral IV catheters from all patients in the
medical ward. This MDV was used for an undeﬁned period,
frequently till empty. Standard sampling practice included
disinfection of the rubber injection ports with isopropyl
alcohol 70% and subsequent sampling with sterile syringe and
needle. However, shortly before the outbreak the sampling
procedure had changed: a needleless dispensing pin with Luer
lock and stopper was attached to the Ringer lactate bag and
left in place. For sampling, the stopper of the dispensing pin
was unscrewed to ﬁt the syringe and re-screwed after ﬂuid
withdrawal, no additional sterile stoppers were available. The
dispensing pin had been received as part of an in-kind donation
of medical supply and had been introduced without adaptation
of the nursing care protocol.
Corrective and preventive actions included the discontin-
uation of the use of a dispensing pin and re-enforcement of
aseptic procedures, i.e. swabbing of rubber injection ports with
isopropyl alcohol wipe before withdrawal with sterile needle
and sterile syringe. In addition, it was decided – in the absence
of small volume packaging – to use the 1 L bag as MDV for
only 24 h, with a day and time mark as control. Procedures
were further adapted to specify NaCl 0.9% and not Ringer
lactate or glucose containing solutions for catheter ﬂushing.
Finally, monthly surveillance cultures of MDV were installed.
Nursing and medical staff were properly informed during the
outbreak investigation and procedures were plenary discussed
and approved. During the 10 months after the outbreak, no
blood cultures with Bcc isolates were noted at SHCH and
surveillance cultures of the MDV remained sterile.
FIG. 2. Timeline of the outbreak. For patient 4 the blood culture
(BC) became positive at the day of discharge. Environmental sampling
included: (a) antiseptic solutions, (b) unopened stock materials for IV
ﬂuid administration and oxygen masks, (c) IV catheter and NaCl 0.9%
of patient 5 and antiseptic solutions, (d) Ringer lactate multiple-dose
vial and dispensing pin.
FIG. 3. RAPD proﬁles primer 270 Left: primer 272 Right: Lanes 1 and 19: molecular size markers; lanes 2–6 and 8, 9, 11: B. cepacia blood culture
isolates; lanes 7,10,11: environmental isolates (IV catheter from patient 5, Ringer lactate used as MDV, dispensing pin respectively); lane 13: B. cepacia
blood culture isolate from Kampong Cham hospital; lanes 14–18: B. cepacia reference strains (see text, for Right: lane 14 is missing, but showed a
distinct proﬁle on repeat testing); lane 20: blank control.
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Discussion
Bcc species are frequently reported from outbreaks, often but
not exclusively in immune-compromised patients. In a system-
atic review of HAI related to contaminated substances, Bcc
ranked ﬁrst (together with Enterobacter spp.) as contaminating
pathogen in substances other than blood [12]. Both intrinsic
contamination (during manufacturing) and extrinsic contami-
nation (after opening) of medical solutions and equipment have
been reported [13–16].
The use of MDV is common practice in RLS but harbours a
high risk for extrinsic contamination. Vonberg et al. [12]
described that in 49.2% of 130 drug-related outbreaks the
use of MDV was reported. When using single dose vials
(intended to use only once and consequently without antibac-
terial preservatives) as MDV, the risk for contamination is even
higher. Solutions with a high nutrient content -such as Ringer
lactate and glucose containing solutions- will enhance survival
and multiplication of bacteria after contamination and are not
recommended as ﬂushing solutions [17]. Alcohol hand hygiene,
disinfection of vial gums and injection ports, compliance with
storage conditions and vial dating are pivotal practices in case
the use of MDV cannot be avoided [18]. In 2010 the Cambodian
Ministry of Health launched a National Strategic Plan and
Guidelines for Infection Control in Health Care Facilities, these
guidelines address the risks of MDV, describe aseptic handling
and discourage the use of MDV for different patients [19].
The presently used dispensing pen had been introduced
without thorough risk analysis and adaptation of the proce-
dures. As for drugs and equipment, in-kind donations of
medical devices and consumables should be assessed for
relevance and appropriateness [20]. Indeed, concerns have
risen about the so-called needleless devices as they have been
associated with increased risk for catheter-related BSI due to
difﬁcult antisepsis [21]. Likewise, Chodoff et al. [22] described
a polymicrobial Gram-negative outbreak of BSI with a similar
needleless connector used for catheter ﬂushing.
The present study shows evidence of B. cepacia as a HA
pathogen in tropical RLS. Particularly in South-East Asia,
laboratory identiﬁcation of Bcc bacteria can be challenging as
differentiation from Burkholderia pseudomallei, the agent causing
life-threatening melioidosis, is required. B. pseudomallei
accounted for 12% of clinically signiﬁcant bacteria isolated
from blood cultures in SHCH [23]. In the present study recA
gene sequence analysis was used for species identiﬁcation
within the Bcc, because standard or commercial phenotypical
tests such as API 20NE are unable to identify Bcc members
unequivocally to the species level [24]. RAPD analysis has been
used before in Bcc outbreaks to assess clonal relationship
because of its high discriminatory power; furthermore it is less
complex and faster than the more widely used pulsed ﬁeld gel
electrophoresis [10]. Both recA sequencing and RAPD analysis
are techniques not in reach of RLS. However, as shown in the
present report, the subsequent recovery of Bcc from clinical
samples by itself should point to the possibility of HAI.
Similar to B. pseudomallei, Bcc species are resistant to
polymyxin and aminoglycosides (with the exception of B. viet-
namensis for the latter) [26] but unlike B. pseudomallei, they are
resistant to amoxicillin-clavulanic acid, whereas the vast
majority of B. pseudomallei isolates are susceptible [25,27]. In
addition, cross-reaction of B. cepacia with the B. pseudomallei
speciﬁc latex agglutination is not reported [28] and only rarely
occurs for Bcc members (personal communication with
Vanaporn Wuthiekanun).
Close collaboration between diagnostic laboratory and
medical and nursing staff should assure swift communication of
healthcare associated infection alerts. The use of multiple-dose
vials should be avoided and newly introduced procedures
should be assessed for their infection control risks. Without
appropriate microbiological culture facilities the rate of
healthcare associated infections will remain underestimated
in resource-limited settings.
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